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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAwS - NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY PERMITS
AVOIDANCE OF MASSACHUSETTS' LIMITATION ON WRONGFUL
DEATH r-EcovERY.- Plaintiff's intestate, a New York domiciliary,
was killed when one of defendant's airplanes crashed in Nantucket,
Massachusetts, on a flight from a New York airport. The Mass-
achusetts wrongful death statute contained a $15,000 maximum re-
covery limitation.' Plaintiff brought suit in the New York Supreme
Court alleging three causes of action: for damages under the Mass-
achusetts wrongful death statute; for breach of contract of safe car-
riage, alleging damages of $150,000 for "loss of accumulations of
prospective earnings"; and for conscious pain and suffering. The
Appellate Division reversed the Special Term's denial of defendant's
motion to dismiss the contract action. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, agreeing that the
action sounded in tort for negligently causing death. However, the
Court of Appeals went on to say that if plaintiff amended his
first cause of action, it would be possible if the proof so justified,
to recover more than the $15,000 maximum specified in the
Massachusetts Act. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133.(1961).
The discussion of the effect of the Massachusetts limitation: on
a New York domiciliary occasioned two separate concurring opin-
ions which took issue with the majority's apparent diversion from
the specific question before the Court. A party, on appeal, generally
is not permitted to raise questions in the Court of Appeals which
have not been presented nor passed upon by the courts below.2
The Court's enormous task of harmonizing the law and cases of
the entire state requires such a rule.3 Naturally, if one party raises
a new question on appeal which, although not raised below, would
MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 229 § 2 (1955). The statute was amended after
the accident involved in the principal case and effective January 1, 1959,
the maximum amount of recovery became $20,000. The minimum recovery
amount remained $2,000. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229 § 2 (Supp. 1960).
SPeople cx rel. Rutland R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 243 N.Y. 543, 154
N.E. 597 (1926) (per curiam); People ex rel. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 208 N.Y. 589, 102 N.E. 1111 (1913) (memorandum
decision).
s See CoH¢EN & KARGEa, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORE COURT OF
APPEALs 16-17 (1952).
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have conclusively required a decision in his favor,4 it would be a
"perversion of justice" 5 to deny its consideration by the appellate
court. However, in the principal case, as Judge Fuld's concurring
opinion points out, the question of avoiding the Massachusetts limit
was not argued by either party and was not even raised or presented
by the record. The Court took it upon itself to discuss the issue
and to advise 6 the plaintiff that the $15,000 limitation was not
binding. The wide scope of the language used and its possible
consequences are noteworthy.
At common law there was no recovery for wrongful death.7
The first effort to remedy the situation was the passage of Lord
Campbell's Act 8 in England in 1846, and at the present time every
American state has some type of statutory remedy for wrongful
death." However, the passage of these statutes produced the problem
of deciding whether the substantive right, or cause of action created
in one state, would be enforced in another.' 0 Generally, state courts
entertain suits arising under foreign statutes if the particular statute
creating the cause of action, does not violate the public policy of
the forum." But, having decided to recognize a right created else-
where, ordinary reason warns that the court carefully examine the
particular foreign statute to determine just what the right entails.'"
4 See Persky v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n, 261 N.Y. 212, 185 N.E.
177 (1933). See generally COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 624-33.
5 Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. Cas. 544, 565 (N.Y. 1820).
6 The propriety of the majority's concern with the Massachusetts statute
is questionable in view of the underlying concept that the Court of Appealshas no advisory jurisdiction. See COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. mspra note 3,
at 361-62.
7 Crowley v. Panama R.R., 30 Barb. 99 (N.Y. 1859); GOODRIcH, CoNFUCT
OF LAWS 294-96 (1949).8 Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
9 PROssER, ToRTs 710 (2d ed. 1955). Most of the American statutes,
"death acts," are modeled after Lord Campbell's Act and create a new
cause of action in favor of designated persons; others, "survival acts," seek
to preserve the cause of action vesting in the decedent at the moment of death
and enlarge it to include the damages resulting from his death. Ibid. See also,
MCCORMIcK, DAM-AGES 335-37- (1935).
10 See Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N.Y. 28, 179 N.E. 249 (1932) ; Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
11 E.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 10; Higgens v. Central New
England & W.R.R., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N.E. 534 (1892). See BEALE, SELEc-
TIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLIcr OF LAws § 378.3 (1935). In Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 10, Judge Cardozo noted that courts do not
close their doors to a right created elsewhere unless "help would violate some
fundamental principal of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals,
some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
Public policy is defined as "the law of the state, whether found in the Con-
stitution, the statutes or judicial records. in People v. Hawkins, 157
N.Y. 1, 12, 51 N.E. 257, 260 (1898).
12 No action can be brought for death resulting in another state unless a
right is given by the laws of that state. Thus, of necessity, the forum where
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Thus, in the principal case, a cause of action for wrongful death
arose under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute and the bulk
of the Court's opinion was concerned with just how much of that
statute governed the action brought by a New York domiciliary in
a New York court.
It is a rule of the law of conflicts that the substantive law of
the place where the tort action arose governs the action itself,
while the law of the forum dictates the procedure to be followed.' 3
The courts of the forum are then presented with the difficult problem
of determining what is "substantive" and what is "procedural." 14
Considering itself not bound by any controlling New York
decisions,' 5 the majority in the principal case undertook to decide
the proper classification for the measure of damages in this action
under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. The Court pointed
out that any limitation on recovery in a wrongful death action was
so completely contrary to New York's public policy that a New
York court should refuse to apply the limitation portion of the
Massachusetts statute-at least where a New York domiciliary was
concerned. Swayed by this strong public policy, the Court decided
to treat the measure of damages in death actions as procedural and
thus a matter controlled by New York law. 16
By classifying the measure of damages as procedural, the Court
of Appeals took issue with most American courts which feel that
the measure of damages in a wrongful death action is part and
parcel of the cause of action, and thus governed by the law of the
a death action is brought must look to a foreign statute. See BEALE, op. cit.
supra note 11, at § 378.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 296.
23 BEAi-, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 584.1; LEa.AR, Coz-ucr OF LAws
109 (1959) ; cf. RESTASTEmENT, CONs-cr OF LAws § 585 (1934).
14 RESTATEmENI', CONFLiCr OF LAWS § 584 (1934). That this determina-
tion is indeed a difficult one, see Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" ins the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933) ; See also Justice Frankfurter's
comments in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1945).
1 However, as Judge Froessel's concurring opinion indicates, the Court
of Appeals affirmed an Appellate Division decision in Royal Indem. Co. v.
Atchison T. & S.F.R.R., 272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1st Dep't), aff'd
mere., 297 N.Y. 619, 75 N.E.2d 631 (1947), which held, inter alia, that an
action for wrongful death and the extent of damages are governed by the
law of the place where the tort was committed. In Riley v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 457, 199 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1960), it was decided that
the limitation on recovery in the West Virginia death statute was a matter
of substance. In Dike v. Erie R.R., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871), referring to the
damages arising from a breach of contract, Judge Allen declared that "the
rule and measure of damages pertains to the right and not to the remedy."
Id. at 118.
16 Other elements besides a strong local policy which may enter into the
forum's classification of what is substantive or procedural are noted in LEa'AR,
op. cit. mpra note 13, at 104-06. The formation of New York's policy on
death action recovery is traced by Judge Desmond in the instant case.
1961]
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place where the deceased suffered injury. 17 In line with. the pre-
vailing opinion, there are some New York cases which also had
taken the view that the laws of the place where the injuries causing
death were inflicted, govern the cause of action for wrongful death,
as well as the extent of the damages recoverable.' 8 Despite this
prevalent attitude, there is a somewhat analagous situation in which
a different result is recognized. It may happen that the state where
the action is brought has a statute representative of a strong public
policy which prohibits recovery beyond a certain amount. In this
case, the statute of the forum may mark the top limit of recovery
there.' 9 Such a situation is clearly distinguishable from the principal
case where the Court is seeking to avoid and exceed the limit of the
place of the 'wrong, as imposed by its statute.20
Those opposing this prevailing view as to the classification of
the measure of damages, look upon it as a matter concerned with
the remedy, rather than the right itself, and therefore procedural.2'
This theory occasions at least two serious difficulties when we have
a right created solely by statute, as is the case in the wrongful
death action which was non-existent at common law, and the statute
itself contains the measure of damages to be awarded.22
17 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R, 194 U.S. 120 (1904); MCCORMICK, DAM-
AGES 6 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 417 (1934).
18 Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., supra note 15; Faron v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct 1948). The
circumstances of the Faron case were very similar to those in the principal
case: the complainant sought recovery for the wrongful death of the decedent
who died in an airplane crash in Connecticut which had a $20,000 recovery
limitation in its wrongful death statute. The court held that the right to
bring the action for wrongful death and the extent of the damages depended
on the laws of Connecticut. See also Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y.
99, 109, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918); cf. Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., supra
note 15.
19 See LEFLAR, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 119, 220 n.57 (1959); RESTATEliENT,
CoNmucr oF LAWS §§ 417, comment a at 606 (1934). Similarly, when the court
in Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891)
refused to apply the Pennsylvania damage law which permitted unlimited
recovery, New York had a limitation on recovery in death actions of $5,000.
20 It seems that by imposing a limitation on recovery, any legislature would
be acting within its proper bounds, especially where there was no recovery at
all at common law. In Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540, 185 N.E. 389
(1935), when confronted with a Rhode Island death statute which fixed both
the right and the extent of the right, the Massachusetts court declared that
"to substitute for the Rhode Island measure of damages the Massachusetts
punitive formula for their ascertainment would produce a result which neither
Legislature... contemplated." Id. at 546, 185 N.E. at 391. Similarly, it can
be recognized that any attempt to completely jgtwre a limitation imposed by
a statute would produce a result which the legislature did not contemplate.
21 See Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R.R., s'upra note 19; GoODRIcH, CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS 251 (1949) ; LEFLAR, op. cit. mpra note 19, at 118.
22 If a statute is silent as to the amount recoverable or if it prescribes no
limitation, it can be argued that the legislature did not intend to make the
damages a part of the right but merely a remedy to be ascertained in each
[ VOL. 35
19611 RECENT DECISIONS
For example, in the principal case, plaintiff's right to maintain
the wrongful death action arose only because a Massachusetts statute
created such a right and yet a New York court set about to avoid
a portion of the statute merely by classifying it as remedial or
procedural. The sound contention can be raised that the Mass-
achusetts legislature inserted the limitation on recovery because it
intended to create only a limited right where none existed before.
Viewed in this light, the limitation portion of the statute is more
than a remedy-it is the right itself.23 Secondly, as Judge Froessel's
concurring opinion points out,24 the New York court has no power
to determine what the public policy of Massachusetts should be; 25
the Massachusetts public policy against allowing more than a
limited recovery can be just as strong as the New York abhorrence
of any such limitation.26 Yet, New York stepped in and substituted
its policy for the damage portion of the Massachusetts statute.
The principal case indicates that in future cases involving
similar circumstances, New York will apparently delete a portion
of a statute promulgated by the legislature of a sister state, which
portion limits the amount of recovery in wrongful death actions,
and substitute New York's "policy," 27 which prohibits the im-
position of a limitation on recovery in such actions. The qualifying
word "apparently" is used here because the Court of Appeals made
particular case. The forum would then be justified in supplying its own
limitation.
23 Cf. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) where the Court, while holding
that the suit in admiralty for recovery in a death action had to be com-
menced within the period prescribed by the statute, stressed that if the
admiralty was to adopt the statute it had to "take the right subject to the
limitations which have been made a part of its existence." The Court went
on to say that "the liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes,
and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of
the right." Id. at 214.24 Filberg v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 47, 172 N.E.2d 526,
534-35, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 142 (1961) (Froessel, J. concurring).
25 Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 443, 46 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1943) (dictum).
26 When the Massachusetts death statute was amended in 1959, the leg-
islators saw fit to retain a limitation although they raised the amount to$20,000.
27 In the past session of the legislature, there was a proposed amendment
to the Decedent Estate Law § 130 which, although it died in committee of the
State Assembly, is some further illustration of New York's policy. The
amendment would have provided that "where a resident of this state originated
a plane flight in this state aboard a common carrier pursuant to purchase
of passenger accommodations the airline company at the time of the pur-
chase of such passenger accommodations and/or contract for transportation
shall be deemed as a part of such contract to consent that if a passenger's
death thereafter occurs outside the state as the result of an airplane accidenit
during the course of the trip so purchased, the accident shall be deemed to
have occurred in the State of New York in an action commenced pursuant
to section 130 of this chapter." A. Inf. 1117, Pr. 11.17 (1961).
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its attitude known in a portion of the opinion that cannot properly
be considered the holding.
From the Court's language, it appears that its entire discussion
of the limitation controversy would not have been "necessary" if
recovery had been sought for someone other than a New York
domiciliary. The question then arises as to how a sister state,
Massachusetts, for example, would treat a New York resident
seeking recovery in that state under a cause of action arising in
New York. Another interesting aspect of the principal case would
present itself if the defendant were permitted to remove the case
to a federal court in New York. The federal court would look
to New York law for the conflict of laws principles to be applied 28
and the problem would present itself as to the weight to be given
to the statements of the Court of Appeals in the principal case con-
cerning the treatment to be afforded the measure of damages.
Finally, the question of giving full faith and credit to the laws of
a sister state is almost certain to arise since the statutory measure
of damages, despite New York's policy, is generally considered sub-
stantive rather than a matter of procedure; and consequently, when
the portion of one state's statute dealing with the measure of
damages is ignored by a sister state, substantive rights may be
affected. 29  The constitutional issues involved, i.e., denial of full
28 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); cf. Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 In John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182-83
(1936), the United States Supreme Court held that the Georgia Supreme
Court denied full faith and credit to the laws of New York by classifying as
remedial, a matter which a New York statute, as construed and applied by
Ne.e York's highest court, regarded as determining the substantive rights of
the parties. Similarly, in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55,
69, (1909), the Court noted that § 906 of the Revised Statutes gave the
same full faith and credit to the "Public Acts" of territories (New Mexico
was then a territory) as was given to state laws under the Constitution, and
that consequently, a cause of action arising in such a territory was to be
given the same force and effect if brought elsewhere. It was tot to be
enlarged because one party saw fit to go to another jurisdiction where
service could be obtained on the defendant.
Finally, in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), an action
was brought in a United States Circuit Court sitting in Texas, under a
Mexican death statute. On certiorari, Justice Holmes stated that "it seems
to us unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the
foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the
benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would impose." Id.
at 126. The Court concluded that the Circuit Court was wrong in dis-
regarding the Mexican law and applying the Texas statute, even in the
absence of a full faith and credit requirement. Id. at 128.
But see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), where the
Supreme Court held that the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution
did not compel Pennsylvania to apply the Alabama statute of limitations to a
case arising under the Alabama death statute.
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faith and credit or possibly, violation of due process,80 merit serious
consideration.
CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF BUILDING CONTRACT-
ARBITER'S AWARD OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CONFIRMED BY COURT.
Appellant construction company agreed to erect a five million dollar
building upon its own land for subsequent rental to respondent.
The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes and empowered
the arbiter to grant specific performance. The Court of Appeals,
affirming the confirmation of an award of specific performance, held
that the Supreme Court had acted properly in confirming the award,
since, had this matter appeared directly before the court in a suit
requesting equitable relief, the court would not have abused its
discretion by granting specific performance under the facts of the
case. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d
133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
The Grayson-Robinson case bears a striking resemblance to the
hotly-discussed Matter of Staklinski,' in which the Court of Appeals
confirmed an arbitration award of specific performance which re-
quired an employer to continue in its service an officer whom it
considered disabled. Both cases came before the court as arbitra-
tion awards of specific performance requiring confirmation. Both
awards granted affirmative relief in areas where courts of equity
have traditionally declined to do so. Both were confirmed by a
sharply divided court. In Matter of Staklinski the plaintiff re-
ceived from the court only what he requested--confirmation, noth-
ing more, nothing less. There was not the slightest suggestion
that if the merits had appeared originally before the court the
result would have been the same.2  The majority opinion in
Grayson-Robinson, however, would appear to contain a far different
implication. Chief Judge Desmond states that:
[A]ssuming that the equity court in an original suit would have discretion to
refuse specific performance, and even making the" very large assumption that
30 See generally Goovaicn, CoNFicT oF LAws 242-44 (1949). Compare
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), in which the Supreme Court
held that two New York corporations were deprived of property without due
process, where Texas had applied a statute which imposed a greater obligation
than the one agreed upon by the parties in a contract made and to be per-
formed outside of Texas.
'6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959). See 34 ST.
JonN's L. REv. 293 (1960).
2 Matter of Staklinski, supra note 1, at 163-64, 160 N.E.2d at 80, 188
N.Y.S2d at 543.
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